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My aim in this paper is to examine the nature of and the relation 
between Descartes ' three proofs of God 's existence in the 
Meditations. Within this aim I want to pursue and argue three 
interrelated theses: (I) that Descartes' three proofs of God's 
existence in the Meditations are in fact (or rather function as, were 
intended by Descartes as) deductive demonstrations, (II) that all 
three proofs are logically independent of each other, and (III) that 
the ordering of the three proofs in the Meditations was for 
psychological rather than logical or methodological reasons. 
I 
After one has read Descartes' Meditations for the very first 
time, it will probably come as a surprise to learn that there are 
basically two ways of regarding the nature of the three arguments 
for God's existence in the Meditations. The prima facie way is, of 
course, to view them as deductive inferences, as arm-chair proofs. 
In this way if you assent to the truth of the premises and if you 
agree that the form of the argument is valid, then you must (logical 
must) assent to the truth of the conclusion. The other way, 
interestingly, is to view the arguments in question not as inferences 
at all but rather as meditative exercises leading in the end to the 
intuition that God necessarily exists. If a label is required for this 
second way, we may call these arguments introspective ostensive 
proofs. Unlike demonstrative proofs,1 of which classical examples 
1 There is considerable scholarly dif ficulty occasioned by Descartes' ambigu-
ous use in his corpus of the Latin and French equivalents of the words "deduc-
tion" and "demonstration." Concerning "deduction," Descartes, on the one hand, 
in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, defines this term as meaning "the 
inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions 
which are known with certainty" (1:15). On the other hand, in Part Three of the 
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may be drawn from geometry, these proofs prove by "pointing" or 
"showing." For instance, if I want to prove to you that snow exists, 
the decisive way is not to produce some sort of a priori inference 
but rather to take you to a place where there is snow. This, indeed, 
is the typical way we prove things in everyday life. But now as 
regards the three proofs of God's existence in the Meditations, on 
this view the "showing" or "pointing" is not in an external sense as 
with the snow example, but rather in an internal, introspective sense, 
the intended result being, as already said, the gaining of a private 
intuition that God necessarily exists. 
Perhaps the most detailed defense of this second view of the 
proofs in the Meditations was given by Stanley Tweyman (1979). 
In his view both proofs in the Third Meditation are "paedagogic 
devices and not demonstrations, and should be appreciated as such" 
(p. 177). (He also includes the third proof in this category, the 
Principles of Philosophy, on the topic of explanatory hypotheses for physical 
phenomena, Descartes says "And if it is thought that the hypothesis is false. I 
shall think I have achieved something suf ficiently worthwhile if everything de-
duced from it agrees with our observations: ... " (1:255). From these and other 
examples Desmond Clarke (1977) in his extensive survey concludes that for 
Descartes "the word 'deduction' covers a wide range of inferential procedures, 
such as induction [which for Descartes includes any inference which involves a 
series of deductive steps], arguments by analogy, deductive inference in formal 
disciplines such as logic or mathematics, hypothetico-deductive explanations, retro-
deductive inferences, or any argument the structure and evidentiary value of which 
is clear" (p. 115). As for the term "demonstration" Clarke concludes that "The 
result of a 'deduction' is what Descartes calls a demonstration, although the word 
'demonstrate* is also used in contexts where it simply means 'to show clearly* 
(for example, by providing unambiguous observational evidence)" (p. 1 15). How-
ever, as we shall see in the context of Descartes' analysis-synthesis distinction, 
Descartes also uses the term "demonstration" to denote an inferential process 
rather than just its product. Given the above ambiguity and the purposes of the 
present work, then, when 1 use the term "deductive demonstration" (or synony-
mously "demonstrative proof) I mean it in the narrow (contra Descartes) though 
thoroughly modern sense of deductive inference (not necessarily syllogistic, and 
not necessarily involving Descartes' restriction quoted in the Rules above). My 
main purpose is to distinguish and contrast it to a very dif ferent kind of demon-
stration, what I have termed "introspective ostension." Whereas both the former 
and the latter involve the practical matter of psychological success or failure, 
only the deductive kind of demonstration involves the logical matter of sound-
ness or validity. 
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ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation, as we shall see a little 
later on.) Tweyman goes on to say that "it is clear that the proofs of 
God's existence in the Third Meditation should not be assessed in 
terms of validity and soundness: they are to be assessed solely in 
terms of whether or not they are able to turn the attention to the 
connection between the self and God" (p. 179). "Once the mind," 
he continues a little further, "has been unprejudiced and the need 
for establishing the connection between the idea of God and the 
idea of self has been recognized, it only remains to have the required 
intuition of this connection in order to know that God exists" (p. 
179 )2 
To this interpretation of Descartes' program (and I must stress 
here that it is an interpretation) Tweyman suggests that he can find 
Descartes' own concurrence not inside but outside the Meditations 
in his related writings. "The most important passage in this 
connection " Tweyman tells us, "is to be found in the Replies to 
the second set of Objections" (p. 177). Tweyman brings to our 
attention Descartes' discussion therein (II: 110-1 l l ) 3 in which 
Descartes draws a distinction between the analytic and synthetic 
styles of proof. Tweyman tells us that according to Descartes only 
the latter style employs demonstrations but that he (Descartes) used 
2 For a similar though not quite as extreme view, see Hatfield (1986). Accord-
ing to Hatfield, "Descartes' Meditations are not so much a continuous argument 
as a set of instructions for uncovering the truths that lie immanent in the intellect. 
Not that there are no arguments in the Meditations: the language of argument is 
interspersed throughout the work. But some conclusions seem to arrive out of 
nowhere, without discursive argument—such as the conclusion that the essence 
of matter is extension, or that one can discover in one's thought the idea of an 
infinite, benevolent being" (pp. 47-48). Hatfield, however , seems quite undecided 
and even ambiguous on, and certainly does not attempt to answer . the question 
whether the three proofs of God's existence in the Meditations are introspective 
ostensions or deductive inferences. (That they could be both is a possibility I will 
examine later on.) At one point he says "the immediate apprehension of the idea 
of God serves as a basis for the argument to God's existence (Third and Fifth 
Meditations)" (p. 50). Elsewhere, however. he says "the cognitive exercises of 
the Meditations are engineered... to exercise one's intuition through the illumina-
tion of the cogito and the proofs of God's existence,..." (p. 71). 
The numbers in Roman numerals refer to the particular volume of the 
Cottingham et at. (1985, 1991) translation of Descartes' philosophical works. 
The numbers following the colon refer to pages in those volumes. 
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the former style in the Meditations. The former style is appropriate 
for metaphysics, the latter for geometry. As to why, Tweyman tells 
us: 
In geometry, the primary notions are readily 
accepted, given that they accord with what the 
senses reveal; hence in geometry what remains is 
to demonstrate what follows necessarily from the 
primary notions with which we begin. But in 
metaphysics, the senses prejudice the mind so that 
its primary notions are not perceived clearly and 
distinctly. In metaphysics, therefore, the problem 
is to direct the attention toward its primary notions 
so that they can be apprehended clearly and 
distinctly. In the Fifth Meditation Descartes makes 
the same point, namely, that were it not for 
prejudice, a knowledge of God would be intuitive: 
... [p. 178] 
Now clearly, to simply point out in contradiction to this view 
and in support of the former deductive view that Descartes often 
calls his arguments for God's existence "proofs" (e.g. II: 10:45:166, 
111:231:376,etc.) just won't do; for clearly "proofs" can be basically 
of two sorts, either inferential or ostensive. Therefore nothing is 
gained by such a response. A more detailed analysis is required. 4 
But it seems to me that one does not have to spend much effort 
to dismantle the second view as expounded by Tweyman, and that 
this can be accomplished by a few relatively simple moves. 
First, Tweyman, it seems to me, gives us not an altogether 
accurate picture of Descartes' distinction between the analytic and 
synthetic styles of proof. Indeed on at least one point I think it can 
be shown that he is incorrect, and that this has serious negative 
repercussions for his view. According to Tweyman, the synthetic 
style "suits geometry, but not metaphysics" (p. 177). Now, although 
it is true that Descartes does say something like this (cf. II: 111), to 
4 For a modest and brief attempt at combining these two views into one and 
attributing this to Descartes, see, for instance, Copleston (1963:123). 
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infer from this as Tweyman obviously does that for Descartes the 
analytic style (the style of the three proofs in the Meditations) is 
not geometric is just plain mistaken. In his Second Set of Replies 
Descartes considers the proposal that he should set out his arguments 
in a "geometrical fashion" so as to make his proofs easier to perceive 
"at a single glance" (11:110). And to this he replies, in effect, that 
he has already set them out in a geometrical fashion (cf. 11:9). He 
says "I make a distinction between two things which are involved 
in the geometrical manner of writing, namely, the order, and the 
method of demonstration." As for the order, what is involved is 
that whatever comes first must not depend on whatever comes later, 
and whatever comes later must depend on whatever came before. 
This order, he tells us, "I did try to follow ... very carefully in my 
Meditations" As for the method of demonstration, he tells us that 
"this divides into two varieties: the first proceeds by analysis and 
the second by synthesis." The analytic style employs the actual 
steps in which the proof in question was "discovered methodically," 
with the result that the attentive and sympathetic reader will feel 
that he is discovering the proof for himself. The synthetic style, on 
the other hand, does not reproduce the order of methodological 
discovery, and so does not inspire in the reader a sense of discovery; 
rather it merely sets the proof out in compact and dry form, 
demonstrating the conclusion from a combination of "definitions, 
postulates, axioms, theorems and problems" (11:111). 
The important point in all of this is that according to Descartes 
both the analytic and synthetic are styles of demonstration mdboth 
are geometric. (He even attributes both styles to ancient geometers 
(11:111; cf. 11:4-6).) We may therefore infer that the difference 
between the two styles of demonstration or proof is not anywhere 
near so radical as Tweyman would have us believe, viz. a difference 
between introspective ostension on the one hand and deductive 
inference on the other. Rather both the analytic and synthetic styles 
are of the nature of the latter, namely deductive inference; in both 
styles the conclusion deductively follows (in principle) from the 
premises.This is why Descartes labeled both styles geometric.That 
he obliged his objector and recasted his three proofs in the synthetic 
style was not, as Tweyman thinks, to illustrate how unsuitable the 
synthetic style is for metaphysics; after all, Descartes clearly thinks 
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he has succeeded in recasting his arguments from the one style to 
the other. No, Descartes' purpose was rather to illustrate what he 
himself says is the principal difference between the two styles. This 
difference is not a matter of logic; it is not that the one is inferential 
and the other not. Descartes thinks them both geometrical. Rather 
the difference is primarily didactic; the synthetic style is best for 
compelling the assent of "argumentative or stubborn" readers 
(11:111), whereas the analytic style, since it reproduces the 
methodological order of discovery, is best as a "method of 
instruction" (11:111), as a method best suited for engaging the 
attention of the readers and from which the willing and attentive 
readers will derive the most benefit (II: 112). There is benefit, then, 
to be derived from both styles. But indeed Descartes goes even 
further. He tells us that "both" styles are "necessary" if we are to 
derive what he calls the "full benefit from my work" (11:113). For 
this purpose he therefore proceeded with a short exposition of his 
Meditations in the synthetic style. 
There is a further implication from all of this that I will reserve 
for section III. But for present purposes it will be sufficient to note 
that, far from supporting his thesis, Tweyman's principal piece of 
evidence, upon closer inspection, actually supports the contrary 
thesis, that Descartes' three proofs in the Meditations (or rather at 
this point the first proof) are of the nature of deductive inferences. 
This interpretation is I think borne out if we turn to the 
Meditations and look at the proofs themselves. But first we must 
establish that they indeed involve premises separate from a 
conclusion. Unfortunately this is only made explicit outside the 
Meditations. But in both of the passages I am about to examine the 
reference in each is assuredly to the Meditations, as an examination 
of their respective contexts makes clear. 
The most important premise in the Third Meditation is, quite 
simply, the statement that there is in Descartes' mind an idea of 
God. As for the dependence of the first two proofs on this idea, 
Descartes states quite clearly in his First Set of Replies: "... that 
there is within me the idea of a supremely perfect being.The whole 
force of my proof [Descartes here refers to the first two proofs 
joindy] depends on this one fact" (11:78). Note, then, that his proof 
does not establish this fact; rather it depends on it. Note also that 
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he calls this fact a fact and not a hypothesis .We may further observe 
that the interpretation that the statement of this fact serves as a 
premise in Descartes' proofs is clinched in his letter to Mersenne 
dated July, 1641. Descartes clearly states that "the one ['the idea 
we have of God'] can serve as a means or premiss to prove the 
other ['the proposition 'God exists"]" (111:186). 
Keeping this in mind, when we go back to the Third Meditation 
we will, I think, find strong evidence to support the above 
interpretation. Looking at Descartes' first proof, we find established 
prior to his conclusion that God exists the fact that he has within 
him an idea of God. But it is not just a simple idea of God; rather it 
is a composite idea and it is arrived at purely by intuition without 
any deduction. Specifically, it is the idea of a "supreme God, eternal, 
infinite, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent and the creator of all 
things that exist apart from him" (11:28). Clearly, then, the statement 
of this introspectively observable fact must serve as a required 
premise if we are to regard Descartes' first proof as a deductive 
inference. And this is precisely what we find. For as we continue 
in the Third Meditation we find this premise combined with a 
number of other premises which we may list as follows: 
1) every effect must have a cause (this is 
implici t ly presupposed throughout the 
argument; cf. 11:80). 
2) "there must be at least as much reality in the 
efficient and total cause as in the effect of that 
cause" (11:28; cf. 11:97). 
3) the objective reality in an idea must have been 
derived "from some cause which contains at 
least as much formal reality as there is 
objective reality in the idea" (11:28-29). 
4) "there cannot be an infinite regress here" 
(11:29). 
5) I am finite and not wholly perfect (11:31). 
From the combination of these five premises with the previous 
premise which states as a fact the idea Descartes has in him of 
God, Descartes restates this idea and then following in the same 
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paragraph summarily states that "from what has been said it must 
be concluded that God necessarily exists" (11:31; italics mine). That 
God really exists, then, is not here a further intuition, as Tweyman 
would have us believe, but in fact a demonstrative conclusion 
separate from the intuitions and premises from which it is derived. 
Descartes here quite apparently thought that these five premises 
along with the antecedent premise containing his composite idea 
of God were jointly sufficient to validly conclude that God exists. 
Indeed his "must" in the passage quoted above is evidently a logical 
must. That he quite apparently thought his conclusion valid and 
the argument sound because he claims all of the five premises are 
intuitively clear by the natural light and therefore cannot be doubted 
(11:27-31) is no argument against this interpretation.5 It only raises 
5 Interestingly, it is this fact and others like it—principally Descartes' blatant 
Scholastic presumptions in his proofs of God's existence, in apparent disregard 
of his earlier hyperbolic doubt, and moreover in spite of his privately expressed 
scorn for Scholastic philosophy (cf. 111:161)—that has led a number of scholars 
to posit what they call "dissimulation hypotheses," hypotheses that state that 
Descartes intentionally misrepresented major portions of his philosophy; for in-
stance, that in putting forward his proofs of the existence of God, especially in the 
Third Meditation, Descartes was intentionally insincere and dishonest, that those 
proofs do not represent his true view, and that he had ulterior motives of a practi-
cal kind, prompted mainly by the condemnation of Galileo in 1633. (See, for 
instance, Loeb 1986.) While I sympathize somewhat with the strengths of this 
view, my own slant on the matter is a bit dif ferent. It seems to me that Descartes 
not only (of course) wanted to avoid the type of sacred condemnation that was 
leveled against Galileo, but that principally he wanted (i) to supplant Scholastic/ 
Aristotelian science with his own science, and even more basically and widely 
(ii) to supplant Scholastic/Aristotelian philosophy altogether and make his own 
philosophy (metaphysics and science—see his tree in the Principles (1:186)) the 
official philosophy of the Catholic religion. Intimations of this can be found at 
least three years before the condemnation of Galileo, specifically in his letter to 
Mersenne dated April IS, 1630 (111:22-23). But it comes out much more clearly in 
his later writings. In, for instance, his letter to Hyperaspistes dated August, 1641. 
he says in regard to the authority of "Aristotle and his followers" that "I do not 
hide the fact that I trust him less than I trust reason" (III: 195). And in his letter to 
Mersenne dated December, 1640, in regard to his Meditations which he was about 
to complete, he states that "those who have not yet learnt scholastic philosophy 
will find it much easier to learn from this book than from their teachers, since 
they will learn to scom it at the same time" (111:161). Moreover we must also 
consider his purpose for writing his extensive Principles of Philosophy. Shortly 
after he had resolved to begin that project, he tells Mersenne in his letter dated 
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the question, which Tweyman would not have us raise, about the 
validity and soundness of the argument. 6 
Having established, I think, the deductive and inferential nature 
of the first proof in the Third Meditation, it is but a little step to 
conclude the same in regard to the second proof, the proof that 
follows immediately after it. These two proofs are so closely 
connected that Descartes himself thought it a matter of little 
consequence whether the second proof is regarded as a separate 
proof or as an extension of the first proof (cf. 111:231-232). Indeed 
the second proof involves four of the five premises I listed earlier 
as necessarily involved in the first proof. (Missing is what I listed 
as the third premise.) In addition to these four premises we find a 
number of other premises not found in the first proof, the most 
perspicuous being that preservation is in reality constant creation 
(II:33). 7 As with the other four premises, the only justification of 
mid-January, 1641, that his purpose is to present his philosophy "in an order which 
will make it easy to teach" (111:167), that is. as a university textbook. Indeed his 
anti-Scholastic sentiments emerge daringly enough even in his published writ-
ings. I have in mind not only Part One of his Discourse but especially his Preface 
to the French edition of the Principles, in which he states "that among those who 
have studied whatever has been called philosophy up till now , those who have 
learnt the least are the most capable of learning true philosophy" (1:183)—"true 
philosophy": that is to say, his philosophy. In this light his Dedicatory letter to the 
Sorbonne, which prefaces the Meditations, is apparently quite disingenuous. His 
appeal to "the Dean and Doctors of the sacred Faculty of Theology at Paris," 
whom in regards to "human philosophy" he calls "second to none," his expressed 
hope of gaining their of ficial endorsement of his philosophy, was not for the pur-
pose of. as he would have them (and us) believe, defeating and even winning over 
atheists and skeptics (that was but a smoke screen), but to supplant the very phi-
losophy embedded in their university and religious institutions. And all of this 
was not of course without an element of personal glory (cf. his Discourse Part 
One (1:115)). Not surprisingly the plan ultimately failed, experiencing massive 
rejection not only in his own lifetime, but culminating thirteen years after his 
death in the official condemnation of his philosophy by Rome. (See Jolley 1992.). 
6 For an interesting refutation of Descartes' first proof assuming the truth of 
Descartes' Scholastic assumptions, see Mackie (1982:37-39). 
7 A further premise would seem to be the idea that no faculty or power can be in 
me without my being aware of it (11:34). That every effect resembles its cause (cf. 
Conversation with Burman (111:339-340)) is attributed by Gueroult (1984:186) as 
yet a further premise, but this is clearly a mistake, for the implicit use of this 
principle (11:33) and the purpose for which it is used comes after Descartes has 
concluded his second proof. 
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these premises seems to be that they are intuitively clear by the 
natural light and therefore cannot be doubted. As regards the 
preservation/creation premise, for instance, Descartes tells us that 
its intuitive clarity obtains once we fully consider "the nature of 
time" (11:33). Interestingly, in his Discourse, Part Five (1:133), 
Descartes tells us that his formulation of this premise was 
theologically inspired. In fact the inspiration was probably 
Augustine and Aquinas. 8 
The point is that the second proof is as inferential and deductive 
in nature as the first. In fact in broad outline it may be characterized 
as a process of elimination, concluding the real existence of God 
as the only possible cause of the existence of Descartes' self. The 
argument therefore presupposes as a premise the same premise upon 
which the first proof is based, namely the statement of the composite 
and explicit idea of God that Descartes has in him. As Descartes 
himself noted (111:232), without this idea of God in him he could 
not conclude that God is the cause of his existence. The statement 
that Descartes has this idea of God, then, serves as a required 
premise from which, combined with the other premises mentioned, 
the existence of God is deductively inferred by a process of 
elimination. 
At this point it might be appropriate to notice that according to 
Descartes this antecedent idea he has in him of God he later 
concludes in the Third Meditation to be innate (11:35), having always 
been in him. That it is innate, however, does not mean that all of us 
can also perceive it in ourselves as he does. Indeed in his letter to 
Hyperaspistes dated August, 1641, Descartes makes a distinction 
between an implicit and explicit idea of God; the implicit idea is in 
all of us, though not many have an explicit idea. Indeed one of the 
purposes of his Meditations is to make the idea of God in the reader 
as explicit as possible if it is not already. And yet Descartes is 
skeptical that he will have much success. "Some people," he says, 
"will perhaps not notice it even after reading my Meditations a 
thousand times" (111:194; cf. 111:248:336,11:171:348). 
Now, just as the first two proofs required first the establishment 
of the fact that I have in me an idea of God, the exact same is the 
Cf. Copleston (1955:142), with Aquinas' text there cited. 
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case, I suggest, with Descartes' third proof, the ontoiogical proof 
in the Fifth Meditation. Clearly, without the aforementioned fact 
first being established, as with the other two proofs, that there is in 
me the idea of God, and moreover without that idea being made a 
little more explicit, the ontoiogical proof cannot be generated. 
We can see this even more clearly when we attend to what 
Descartes means by "God." According to Descartes the idea of 
God is not a simple idea but rather (just like triangle) a composite 
of ideas; it is the idea of all of God's many perfections (11:45-47; 
cf. 11:28:31:32). This composite, moreover, is tied together by a 
further idea, that all of the perfections are inseparable (11.34).This 
further idea, Descartes claims, is but another of God's perfections. 
And this is not something he formally proves; rather it is something 
he introspects. 
Descartes' ontoiogical argument, then, is based primarily on 
one of these perfections in his idea of God, namely, that existence 
is necessarily one of God's perfections (11:46-47; cf. II: 108). Without 
the attribution of this perfection to God, Descartes clearly could 
not generate the ontoiogical argument. 
But at this point we may wonder, as we did with the first two 
proofs, whether the nature of this proof is that of a deductive 
inference or what I have called an introspective ostension. As 
mentioned earlier, Tweyman (p. 178) thinks that Descartes' third 
proof is also of the latter variety. Once again he suggests that the 
conclusion of the proof is yet a further intuition. In support of his 
interpretation he quotes a passage directly from the Fifth Meditation: 
... as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by 
preconceived opinions, and if the images of things 
perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought 
on every side, I would certainly acknowledge him 
sooner and more easily than anything else. For 
what is more self-evident than the fact that the 
supreme being exists, or that God, to whose 
essence alone existence belongs, exists? [11:47] 
To this admittedly highly suggestive passage Tweyman appends 
the following footnote: 
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This comment of Descartes' in the Fifth Meditation 
indicates that the proof of God's existence offered 
there is also not a demonstration, in the technical 
sense of that term: the removal of prejudice 
requires the analytic method, and the problem of 
prejudice is as much Descartes' concern in the Fifth 
as in the Third Meditation, [p. 178] 
In response to this we may begin with the fact that in both his 
First and Second Set of Replies (11:83 and 11:106-107) Descartes 
recasts his ontological proof from the Fifth Meditation into the 
form of a syllogism, complete with a major premise, a minor 
premise, and a conclusion. Clearly Descartes' intention is that of a 
"demonstration in the technical sense of that term" (to quote what 
Tweyman says the proof in the Fifth Meditation is not). 
But this is not conclusive evidence. Indeed I will suggest that 
in the Fifth Meditation itself the ontological proof is used 
ambiguously as both an intuition (per Tweyman) and a deduction 
(contra Tweyman). How this is so becomes apparent the more we 
attend to the third proof itself and to the logical geography (to use 
Ryle's apt term) of certain of its key words. 
As regards that proof being a deduction, there are places where 
Descartes' language seems quite clear and unambiguous. He says, 
for instance, that "from the fact that I cannot think of God except 
as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and 
hence that he really exists" (11:46). First, notice that from a particular 
psychological fact Descartes deduces that existence is one of God's 
perfections; it is therefore not an original intuition. From this 
deduction he proceeds to make a further deduction, that God actually 
exists. Next, notice that not only the form but also the language of 
the argument indicates a deduction, namely his use of the phrases 
"it follows that" and "and hence that," phrases that don't seem at 
all appropriate for describing intuitions. Indeed when only a little 
later he restates his proof, instead of the former phrase "and hence 
that" he now uses "in inferring that" (11:47). 
In addition to this, notice the close analogy Descartes repeatedly 
draws between his ontological proof of God's existence and proofs 
in mathematics and geometry. The adding of further properties to 
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one's immediate idea of triangle, for instance, he calls "inference" 
(11:47). And indeed further along on the same page he acknowledges 
that the further properties inferred may be in no way apparent as 
the properties began with but may nevertheless be believed as 
strongly. Moreover, earlier in the Fifth Meditation, before he has 
begun his ontoiogical argument, Descartes notes that both the basic 
idea of God and the basic ideas of numbers and shapes are raw 
data, from which further properties that belong to their nature can 
be proved. "Certainly," he says, "the idea of God, or a supremely 
perfect being, is one which I find within me just as surely as the 
idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs 
to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than 
is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property 
belongs to its nature" (11:45). 
On the other hand, as regards the ontoiogical proof being an 
intuition, we may note not only the important passage quoted by 
Tweyman, but another (less important) passage as well. Near the 
end of the Fifth Meditation, Descartes uses the word "perceived" 
(11:48) in his summary statement that God really exists. While the 
word "perceived," of course, can be used in reference to the 
conclusion of a deductive inference, it is also quite appropriate in 
reference to a direct and single intuition, for example that "everyone 
can mentally intuit that he exists, that he is thinking, that a triangle 
is bounded by just three lines, and a sphere by a single surface,... 
Perceptions such as these are more numerous than most people 
realize" (1:14). 
Thus the ambiguity. And I suggest that the ambiguity is real, 
that it is really there in the text. I shall suggest even further that the 
ambiguity is no accident but expresses a particular design on 
Descartes' part, a design he foreshadowed in an earlier work. 
In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind Descartes takes great 
pains to distinguish what he means by intuition and deduction, on 
his view the only two modes of knowing (1:14-15). It is an 
interesting feature of his thought that he regards the latter 
(deduction) at some point coalescing with the former (intuition). 
In Rule Eleven he sums up his thoughts regarding his distinction 
between the two modes. Intuition, he tells us, is a clear and distinct 
perception that takes places "all at once, and not bit by bit" (1:37). 
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Deduction, on the other hand, "does not seem to take place all at 
once: inferring one thing from another involves a kind of movement 
of our mind" (1:37). However, if we go through the deduction over 
and over again in our mind, providing that the deductive process is 
not too long it is possible that that process and the intuition that 
accompanies each step may "coalesce into a single operation" (1:38). 
In this case "I seem to be intuiting the whole thing at once" (1:38). 
The relevance of this to our discussion of the proof in the Fifth 
Meditation should be obvious. It would appear that Descartes, could 
we ask him, would tell us that his ontological proof in the Fifth 
Meditation is both a deduction and an intuition. Since that proof 
(unlike the proofs in the Third Meditation) involves so few premises 
and steps, like the Cogito, ergo sum, though an inference (cf. 
II: 100), 9 it may be grasped all at once and so may properly be 
called an intuition. 1 0 
But now notice. From Descartes* discussion in the Rules, it 
would seem that we may therefore infer that for Descartes there 
are basically two categories of intuitions. The first category is 
intuitions proper, those ideas clearly and distincdy perceived which 
involve no deductions whatsoever. The second category of 
intuitions, on the other hand, does involve deductions; indeed it 
originates from them. 
Now, to which category does the ontological argument in the 
Fifth Meditation belong? Clearly, it belongs to the second category 
of intuitions. Tweyman, therefore, has a legitimate point in 
characterizing that argument as a further intuition. Where he goes 
wrong, however, is in overlooking that it is the type of intuition 
that arises from a deductive process. It is therefore, contraTweyman, 
quite legitimate to question Descartes' ontological argument in 
terms of validity and soundness. 
In sum, then, as we have seen, all three proofs of God's 
existence in the Meditations are based on one idea, the idea (or 
some part of the idea) of God that Descartes finds in his mind. If 
9 Cf. Frankfurt (1966:337-338) regarding this point concerning the Cogito. 
1 0 This analysis, I suggest, would also go far in resolving the dispute between 
Hintikka (1962,1963) and Frankfurt (1966) on whether Descartes' Cogito is an 
inference or an intuition. Both of these philosophers seem to have overlooked this 
crucial analysis. 
DESCARTES' PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 15 
this idea is left implicit and not made explicit, or if this idea is not 
even in him (or anyone else) implicitly, then clearly neither the 
first nor the third proof can ever get started, and indeed all three 
proofs could never conclude the existence of God. 
We may now ask how this antecedent fact which the common 
premise states is established. But we have already seen the answer. 
Clearly it is not established as the conclusion from a proof in a 
formal sense; rather its truth is proved according to Descartes in an 
ostensive sense, in this case an introspective ostensive sense, as an 
intuition (cf. 1:14-15 and 11:35)—hence the mental exercises 
Descartes puts the reader through antecedent to his first proof. The 
object of these exercises is to clear away the confusion produced 
by habit and previous ideas and teachings and by the senses so as 
to produce a clear introspective vision (cf. II: 111 -112). This vision, 
of course, is not according to Descartes God himself, or the 
conclusion that God really exists, but only the idea of God in us 
(cf. 11:97). Having accomplished a clear introspection of that idea, 
Descartes then proceeds to use it in three proofs as a premise in 
conjunction with other premises clearly and distinctly perceived 
so as to soundly infer (ostensibly) the objective existence of God. 
II 
Having, I think, established that all three proofs of God's 
existence in the Meditations are indeed deductive demonstrations, 
it remains to be shown that all three proofs are logically independent 
of each other. 
We may begin with the uncontroversial matter of the 
independence of the first proof in the Third Meditation, the proof 
based on the idea of God as an effect. No one, to my knowledge, 
has ever questioned the independence of this proof from the other 
two, and for obvious reasons. It is the first proof Descartes gives in 
his Meditations and he elsewhere calls it his main proof. However, 
it is interesting to note that there are surprisingly few passages in 
all of Descartes' corpus in which he clearly and explicitly and quite 
uncontroversially affirms that his first proof in the Meditations is 
his main proof. This fact (if true) is rather remarkable. In his 
Synopsis prefacing his Meditations Descartes explicitly calls his 
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first proof in the Third Meditation his "principal argument for 
proving the existence of God" (II: 10). No statement could be more 
explicit. The next best statement to this effect is found at the 
beginning of his First Set of Replies (11:74). All others, I suggest, 
are implicit at best. 1 1 
At any rate, the controversy begins with the question of the 
independence of the second proof in the Third Meditation from the 
first proof. In his First Set of Replies Descartes tells us that his 
purpose in producing the second proof in the Third Meditation was 
not in fact "to produce a different proof from the preceding one, 
but rather to take the same proof and provide a more thorough 
explanation of it" (11:77). However, that the two proofs in the Third 
Meditation should be regarded as one proof or two does not seem 
later much of an issue for Descartes, as seen from his letter to 
Mesland dated May 2,1644: 
It does not make much difference whether my 
second proof, the one based on our own existence, 
is regarded as different from the first proof, or 
merely as an explanation of it. Just as it is an effect 
of God to have created me, so it is an effect of him 
to have put the idea of himself in me; and there is 
no effect coming from him from which one cannot 
prove his existence. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that all these proofs based on his effects are 
reducible to a single one; and also that they are 
1 1 There is another passage, found in one of Descartes' letters, which may at 
first seem to be as unequivocal as the previous two passages. It is in his letter to 
Mersenne dated July, 1641 (111:186). Here he speaks of his "main argument" in 
regard to his proofs of God's existence, and the work implied is clearly the Medi-
tations. However, it is unclear which of the three proofs is his referent. This is 
especially the case if we compare this letter with the previous letter of which it is 
a continuant, his letter to Mersenne dated June 16,1641 (111:183-184). Indeed at 
the end of this letter it may be inferred (from the comparison made to a geometric 
argument based on the definition of triangle: cf. Fifth Meditation (11:46)) that the 
type of proof Descartes has in mind here is most properly the ontological ar gu-
ment. Hence it may be inferred that the reference to his "main ar gument" in the 
subsequent letter, since it is a continuation of the same problem, is the ontological 
argument! 
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incomplete, if the effects are not evident to us ... 
and if we do not add to them the idea which we 
have of God. [111:231-232] 
And yet it seems to me that, if we go back and look closely at 
the two proofs in the Third Meditation, although there is a close 
relation, there is a clear distinction, contra Descartes, between the 
two proofs. The first proof focuses on one particular effect, the 
idea I have of God, and employs an additional number of premises 
to prove that God exists. And though this proof also presupposes 
the existence of myself, my mind, at this point it is not yet thought 
of as an effect, and so no cause of it is yet sought. The second 
proof, on the other hand, does indeed begin (11:33) by considering 
the existence of myself, my mind, as an effect, employs (as I noted 
in section I) almost all of the same premises used in the first proof 
and adds a few new ones, and by a process of elimination arrives at 
the existence of God. Of course, this conclusion cannot be arrived 
at unless one has an idea of God to begin with. But this idea of 
God, as I have shown earlier, is not the conclusion of any proof, let 
alone the first proof, and so is free to be used in any proof. 
Moreover, especially revealing in this regard is the short passage 
that immediately precedes the commencement of the second proof 
and provides the transition point between the two proofs: "I should 
like to go further and inquire," says Descartes, "whether I myself, 
who have this idea [of God], could exist if no such being [God] 
existed" (11:33). Notice first that the second proof is going to 
somehow involve the same idea of God that is used in the first 
proof. But more importantly, we should notice that we are being 
told that the second proof is going to ignore the conclusion of the 
first proof and is going to presuppose that God doesn't exist. Clearly 
the implication, then, is that the second proof is not going to be a 
logical continuation or extension of the first proof; and since it is 
not going to employ the conclusion of the first proof, it is not by 
further implication going to involve any of the correlates of that 
conclusion. 
And so it would seem that the second proof is autonomous; it 
involves nothing that is either peculiar to the first proof or 
established by the first proof. 
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Indeed on this issue scholarly opinion seems roughly divided. 
Both Norman Kemp Smith (1952:302) and Frederick Copleston 
(1963:111) suggest the ultimate independence though the close 
relation of the two proofs. Tweyman indeed provides us with a 
more explicit version of this view. According to Tweyman, 
... at most the first proof establishes God as the 
cause of the idea of God and not as the cause of 
the conceiver of this idea. This is easily explained. 
For Descartes does not deal with all the features 
cited in the idea of God in the first proof. Descartes 
is certainly entitled to enumerate a variety of 
perfections of God as found in the idea of God, 
and deal with these on a selective basis, as he 
deems most profitable to the reader. Accordingly, 
if we look at the latter part of the first proof we 
notice that it focuses on infinitude, omniscience, 
etc; that is, the earlier perfections cited in the above 
quoted passage [11:31]. As we shall see, it is left to 
the second proof to develop the 'creator' aspect 
of God. The advantage to dealing with the 
attributes of God on a selective basis is dealt with 
in the Replies to the first set of Objections: ... 
[11:81-82]. [p. 171] 
Failure to recognize all of this, I suggest, has led not a few 
scholars into confusion. Bernard Williams (1978:150-151), for 
instance, uncritically accepts Descartes' statement (quoted at the 
beginning of this section), in apparent disregard (or ignorance) of 
the later letter to Mesland quoted above. But more important than 
what Descartes elsewhere says about what he is doing in the 
Meditations is what he actually does in the Meditations. And from 
what we have seen above, what he does is apparently provide a 
related though ultimately autonomous argument. That that argument 
shares a number of premises with the first argument does not make 
the second argument dependent. If it did, then, had the second 
argument been placed first (and it clearly could have), the first 
argument, placed second, would have shared a number of premises 
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with the second, and so by the same rationale would have to be 
called dependent. But this is surely specious. Williams thinks the 
second argument is entirely dependent on the first, and his reason 
for thinking this is that it shares a number of premises with the first 
(including the idea of God). For all of the reasons above, his 
argument must be rejected. 
A much more challenging defense of the view that the second 
proof depends on the first comes from Martial Gueroult (1953). 
The substance of Gueroult's argument is given in the following 
paragraph: 
Since this second proof is more absolute than 
the first and it can do without the principle of the 
correspondence of the idea with what is ideated, 
can it be considered as independent from the 
preceding one? No. It is conditioned by it, not 
because it assumes together with it that there must 
be at least as much formal reality in the cause as 
objective reality in my idea of the perfect, but 
because one of its most fundamental principles is 
that no faculty can be in me without my being able 
to have knowledge of it. This principle implies that 
I cannot be in myself other than what I know 
myself to be and that the inference from knowledge 
to being is valid. And this proposition is valid only 
if I know that God exists and cannot deceive me— 
which is what the first proof demonstrates, [pp. 
187-188] 
This passage at first glance seems very impressive and 
formidable. But once we look at it again and examine it closer, we 
find a number of errors that make it unacceptable. 
Gueroult's argument begins by telling us that one of the second 
proof's "most fundamental principles" is that "no faculty can be in 
me without my being able to have knowledge of it" (cf. 11:34). 
This fundamental principle, moreover, this required premise, 
logically implies, he tells us, the implicit proposition that "I cannot 
be in myself other than what I know myself to be" as well as the 
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more general (also implicit) proposition that "the inference from 
knowledge to being is valid." Now the crux of Gueroult's argument 
is that all of this implicitly depends on the proposition that "God 
exists and cannot deceive me," which, he says, "is what the first 
proof demonstrates." 
There are a number of things wrong with this argument. First, 
Gueroult is crediting Descartes with a lot of implicit propositions 
and inferences here, propositions and inferences which might not 
have been originally intended by Descartes. Next, and more 
importantly, while it is true that the first proof demonstrates 
(ostensibly) God's existence, it is not true that it also demonstrates 
(again ostensibly) that God cannot deceive me.The conclusion that 
God is not a deceiver does not appear until after Descartes has 
finished with his second proof (11:35). The knowledge that God is 
not a deceiver, then, does not serve in Descartes' second proof to 
guarantee the truth of the proposition that "I cannot be in myself 
other than what I know myself to be and that the inference from 
knowledge to being is valid." Likewise it does not serve to guarantee 
the truth of the more fundamental principle that "no faculty can be 
in me without my being able to have knowledge of it." To think 
otherwise is to accuse Descartes of not following the geometric 
order of reasons, namely (as we saw in section I), that whatever 
comes before cannot be known by whatever comes later, what in 
his Second Set of Replies (II: 110) he claimed was the program he 
followed in his Meditations. Certainly Gueroult would not wish to 
make this accusation (cf. his Preface; also p. 191). On what, then, 
is the truth of the principles and propositions ascribed by Gueroult 
to Descartes' second proof based? Interestingly, at this point it is 
not yet based on anything. Rather the implication is that so far they 
are only indubitable. (The absolute truth of clear and distinct 
perceptions is not concluded until after the completion of the first 
two proofs (11:43).) And they receive their stamp of indubitability 
in the exact same way as all the other premises (Scholastic or not) 
in the first two proofs receive it: they are intuitively clear by the 
natural light and therefore cannot be doubted (cf. 11:27-31 and 11:33¬ 
34). 
I suggest, then, as the sum of these reflections, that the second 
proof is logically autonomous. Now what of the third proof, the 
ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation? 
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It is interesting to note once again the division among scholars 
on this issue. Copleston( 1963:122-123), Williams (1978:153), and 
Mackie (1982:30), for instance, all agree that the proof in the Fifth 
Meditation is independent of the two proofs in the Third Meditation. 
On the other hand, Kemp Smith (1952) and Gueroult (1953), for 
instance, provide arguments for the opposite position, and since I 
am in disagreement with that position, and since their arguments 
to my mind cover all the basic possibilities, it is to their arguments 
that I shall now turn. 
Kemp Smith's argument is rather brief and its two parts are 
contained in a footnote (p. 304 n.4). The first part consists of a 
rather curious statement: "Descartes does not, in the manner of 
Anselm, regard the ontological argument as an independent self-
sufficient argument. Even if the idea of God be an 'essence', and 
as such justify certain conclusions, these conclusions can have no 
metaphysical validity unless and until it has been proved that the 
idea is divinely conditioned." 
Precisely what is meant by this statement is not sufficiently 
spelled out by Kemp Smith. It seems most likely to me that Kemp 
Smith's point is that Descartes' third proof is circular in that the 
idea of God with which it begins presupposes that it is an effect 
from God, as proven in the first proof. This would seem to be why 
Kemp Smith proceeds to quote the following passage from the 
Fourth Set of Replies: "But I think it is clear to everyone that a 
consideration of efficient causes is the primary and principal way, 
if not the only way, that we have of proving the existence of God" 
(II: 166). (I shall hereafter refer to this passage as the "primary and 
principal way" passage.) 
A further possibility is the argument, leaving aside any matter 
of cause and effect, that the idea of God with which the proof in the 
Fifth Meditation begins is conditioned by or follows from the idea 
of God that we are left with at the end of the Third Meditation. In 
this way, then, the proof in the Fifth Meditation would depend on 
the two proofs in the Third Meditation. But does the text of the 
Meditations support this view? I suggest it does not. 
One possibility is that the idea of God in the third proof is 
derived from the first proof in which it is concluded that God 
necessarily exists. But to say that God necessarily exists is not 
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necessarily to say that existence is one of God's perfections. The 
two statements are not logically equivalent. Nor might I add is the 
latter statement ever inferred or even so much as stated in the first 
proof. For Kemp Smith's argument, if his reference is indeed to 
the first proof, this would have to be the case. But the text does not 
bear him out. The fact is that the idea of God with which Descartes 
begins the first proof in the Third Meditation remains essentially 
the same throughout. Nothing is added to the idea by the end of 
that proof. Rather the conclusion is simply that God really exists 
and that his existence is without beginning or end. 
A better possibility concerns the second proof. In this proof 
the idea of God is developed as the proof proceeds.Two new ideas 
are added to the original idea of God (11:34). The first is that God 
must be the cause of himself, the second is the inseparability of all 
of God's perfections. Though this inseparability is added by 
Descartes as a further perfection of God, it is not relevant to our 
discussion. The first addition, however, is very relevant. By arguing 
that God must be the cause of himself, Descartes is arguing in effect 
that God is the formal cause of himself, or in other words, that 
existence is part of God's essence. Indeed this is confirmed by 
Descartes in his Fourth Set of Replies (11:66-67), wherein he tells 
us that he did not make this explicit because he thought it was self-
evident. In this way, then, the ontoiogical proof in the Fifth 
Meditation may be thought to depend on the Third Meditation. 
The second proof, accordingly, not the first, might have been what 
Kemp Smith had in mind, and the reason for which he quoted in 
support the passage I quoted above from the Fourth Set of Replies. 
Either way, I don't think Kemp Smith's conclusion can be 
maintained, as we shall see from a consideration of Descartes' 
writings both inside and outside the Meditations. 
Interestingly, Gueroult as well (p. 243) quotes the same passage 
I quoted above from the Fourth Set of Replies (the "primary and 
principal way" passage) in order to provide textual evidence for 
his view that the ontoiogical argument in the Fifth Meditation is 
dependent on the two proofs in the Third Meditation. But Gueroult 
uses it to support his own interesting interpretation of this 
dependence. According to Gueroult, Descartes' ontoiogical proof 
in the Fifth Meditation is explicitly made analogous by Descartes 
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to proofs in geometry. Now proofs in geometry (and mathematics), 
even though they involve clear and distinct ideas and perceptions, 
had their validity as well as the veracity of clear and distinct ideas 
and perceptions cast into doubt by the hyperbolic and metaphysical 
doubt of the First Meditation. This doubt was not removed, of 
course, until the Third Meditation, in which the existence of God 
was proved and it was established that he is not a deceiver (11:35), 
and the Fourth Meditation, in which the absolute veracity of clear 
and distinct ideas and perceptions was concluded from the former 
(11:43). The objective validity of geometric proofs, then, depends 
on the proof of God's existence in the Third Meditation. But since 
Descartes' ontoiogical argument in the Fifth Meditation shares the 
same nature with geometric proofs, it too "is subject to the 
demonstration of the objective validity of clear and distinct ideas. 
And this demonstration has been supplied by the proof of God by 
effects" (p. 241). In other words, the proof in the Fifth Meditation 
"is not valid if it is isolated from it [the proofs in the Third 
Meditation]" (p. 248). Or yet in other words again, Gueroult's 
argument may be characterized as the view that the third proof 
depends on the acceptance of the proposition that whatever we 
clearly and distinctly perceive is true, that the truth of this 
proposition was established by Descartes as a consequence of the 
two proofs of God's existence in the Third Meditation, so that the 
ontoiogical proof in the Fifth Meditation is not autonomous but 
depends on those earlier proofs of God's existence. 
To all of this we may begin by contrasting two passages that 
would seem to contradict Kemp Smith ' s and Guerou l t ' s 
interpretation of the dependence of the third proof. Surprisingly, 
these two passages fail to receive notice or even mention by either 
Kemp Smith or Gueroult. First, in his Synopsis to the Meditations 
Descartes explicitly calls his proof in the Fifth Meditation "a new 
argument demonstrating the existence of God" (11:11). But I will 
admit that, though indeed highly suggestive, one cannot logically 
deduce from these words that the "new argument" is unrelated, let 
alone self-sufficient. A related and dependent argument may without 
contradiction be properly called a "new" argument; what may 
warrant the qualifier "new" may be elements in the argument not 
found in the original argument. 
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But now consider the following passage from the First Set of 
Replies: 
... as I readily admit, it [the ontological argument 
in the Fifth Meditation] is the kind of argument 
which may easily be regarded as a sophism by 
those who do not keep in mind all the elements 
which make up the proof. For this reason 1 did 
have considerable doubts to begin with about 
whether I should use it; for I feared it might induce 
those who did not grasp it to have doubts about 
the rest of my reasoning. But there are only two 
ways of proving the existence of God, one by means 
of his effects, and the other by means of his nature 
or essence; and since I expounded the first method 
to the best of my ability in the Third Meditation, I 
thought that I should include the second method 
later on. [11:85; italics mine.] 
There are four things that should be noticed from this passage. 
First, that Descartes seems clearly to assert that there are basically 
two different types or ways of proving God's existence, neither 
one dependent on the other, each as logically valid as the other. 
Second, that though both types are equally valid logically, the first 
type (from effects) is psychologically more powerful and therefore 
more likely to convince the reader than the latter type (from 
essence). Third, that this is why Descartes placed the ontological 
argument last: he was afraid that if he placed it earlier in the 
Meditations (and he clearly implies that he could have), then what 
follows in the Meditations would have been less likely to be 
accepted. Fourth, and most important for the matter in hand, that 
Descartes' ontological argument does not proceed in any way from 
an effect. 1 2 
1 2 In support of this, see the Conversation with Burman, in which Descartes is 
reported to have explicitly stated that his ontological proof in the Fifth Medita-
tion "does not start from some effect" (111:337). 
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Of course, this approach of citing passages against each other 
can prove nothing except at most a particular contradiction in 
Descartes' writings. But I will suggest that there is not even a 
contradiction here, and that both Kemp Smith and Gueroult have 
misread the "primary and principal way" passage, much to the 
detriment of their respective interpretations of the ontoiogical proof 
in the Fifth Meditation. The "primary and principal way" passage, 
it will be recalled, refers to proving the existence of God by efficient 
causes. The two proofs in the Third Meditation, of course, are quite 
clearly proofs from efficient causes. The proof in the Fifth 
Meditation, on the other hand, appears to be not so at all. In it there 
is no mention of causality whatsoever. Kemp Smith, therefore, 
includes in the referent of the "primary and principle way" of 
proving God's existence the ontoiogical argument, but suggests its 
inclusion is because that proof is conditioned by and depends on 
the first two proofs. Gueroult, on the other hand, also thinks the 
third proof depends on the first two, but then concludes, since the 
third proof is not a proof from an efficient cause, that it is excluded 
from the referent in the "primary and principal way" passage. Both 
of these interpretations, I suggest, are wrong, and not so much 
because of the two passages I quoted above that contradict them, 
but because they have misinterpreted both the nature of Descartes' 
ontoiogical argument and the "primary and principal way" passage. 
That they have misinterpreted the "primary and principal way" 
passage is, I think, borne out by a close examination of its context. 
But first, let us quote once again the "primary and principal way" 
passage, this time, however, including its immediate context: 
But I think it is clear to everyone that a 
consideration of efficient causes is the primary and 
principal way, if not the only way, that we have of 
proving the existence of God. We cannot develop 
this proof with precision unless we grant our minds 
the freedom to inquire into the efficient causes of 
all things, even God himself.... In every case, then, 
we must ask whether a thing derives its existence 
from itself or from something else; and by this 
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means the existence of God can be inferred, ... 
[11:166] 
The context of this passage, it should be noted, is the question 
whether God can be the cause of himself. In the Fourth Set of 
Objections (II: 147-148) Arnauld raised this difficulty and concluded 
in the negative. Descartes' reply is found in the context containing 
the passage quoted above. But if we look at this passage carefully, 
and what immediately follows it, we will notice that the reference 
is not only to the argument about God being the cause of himself, 
but also to arguments that prove the existence of God from effect 
to cause. Just below the passage quoted above Descartes makes a 
distinction between efficient and formal causality: something which 
derives its existence from something else does so by an efficient 
cause, while something which derives its existence from itself does 
so by a formal cause. That the conclusion of the Third Meditation 
is that the existence of the idea of God in my mind as well as the 
existence of myself could not have proceeded from any cause but 
God is clear. The two proofs in the Third Meditation, therefore, are 
clearly proofs involving what Descartes calls an efficient cause. 
Now what does Descartes say in the passage quoted above about 
this type of proof? He says quite clearly that it is "the primary and 
principal way, if not the only way, that we have of proving the 
existence of God." From this one might naturally infer that the 
third proof, the ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation, since it 
apparently does not involve efficient causality, is either excluded 
from this "primary and principal way" or is included but merely as 
a tag-along because of its dependence on the first two proofs. 
But this is to either completely misunderstand or totally ignore 
the meaning of the context of this passage. Descartes' point is that 
in God being the cause of himself, both God as formal cause of 
himself and God as efficient cause of himself coalesce. (This is 
hinted at even in the immediate context of the passage as I quoted 
it above.) "Those who follow the sole guidance of the natural light," 
he goes on to say, "will in this context spontaneously form a concept 
of cause that is common to both an efficient and formal cause:.."." 
(11:166). The ontological argument, being an argument from a 
formal cause, from essence, is therefore quite apparently included 
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in the category "efficient cause" in the "primary and principal way" 
passage. In this light, then, not only are both Kemp Smith and 
Gueroult shown to be wrong in their respective interpretations of 
the "primary and principal way" passage, but they lose one of their 
prime pieces of textual support. Moreover, Descartes is saved from 
a contradiction with the two passages I quoted in contrast, 
particularly the "two ways of proving the existence of God" passage 
from the First Set of Replies. 
It is of course true that Descartes goes on in this "primary and 
principal way" section to further qualify what he means and he 
ends up by saying that God is not literally the efficient cause of 
himself. Rather "the formal cause will be strongly analogous to an 
efficient cause, and hence can be called something close to an 
efficient cause" (11:170). But this does not detract from my point 
and add anything in either Kemp Smith's or Gueroult's favor. For 
whether taken literally or analogously, Descartes' ontoiogical 
argument is still included in the category "efficient cause" in his 
"primary and principal way" passage. 
Moreover in this very passage it will be noticed that Descartes 
does not say that the "primary and principal way" proofs must 
involve efficient causality (as Kemp Smith and Gueroult would 
have us believe); rather he says only that they must involve a 
consideration (his own word) of efficient causes. This makes quite 
a difference. For now the consideration of efficient causes need 
not even concern itself specifically with (let alone depend on) the 
question of the efficient cause of my idea of God or the efficient 
cause of myself (the two questions in the Third Meditation). It need 
only ask what would be the efficient cause of God if God exists. 
Descartes' concluding point is that unless one is able to ask for the 
efficient cause of everything, including God, one will never be 
able to arrive at the conclusion of God as formal cause of himself. 
And his analogy for this is Archimedes' proof in which the 
properties of a sphere are demonstrated from taking a cube and 
increasing its number of sides to infinity. If one denies beforehand 
that a sphere can in any sense be a rectilinear figure, "in saying this 
he would not only be failing to establish Archimedes' result, but 
would be prevent ing himself and others from proper ly 
understanding the p roof (11:171). 
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But the proof is in the pudding, as the saying goes, and to best 
establish the independence of Descartes'ontological argument we 
must return to the Meditations and examine the way in which that 
proof is given. 
There is a passage early in the Fifth Meditation in which any 
link with the previous Meditations is severed. Descartes says "even 
if it turned out that not everything on which I have meditated in 
these past days is true, I ought still to regard the existence of God 
as having at least the same level of certainty as I have hitherto 
attributed to the truths of mathematics" (11:45). Why? Two reasons. 
First, because, as he says right above this passage, "the idea of 
God, or a supremely perfect being, is one which I find within me 
just as surely as the idea of any shape or number." And second, 
because his ontological proof is basically akin to proofs in 
mathematics and geometry (cf. 11:47). In severing any link to the 
previous Meditations, we may therefore infer that the ontological 
argument in the Fifth Meditation does not presuppose the 
metaphysical and hyperbolic doubt of the First Meditation, nor the 
proofs in the Third Meditation or their consequences. Indeed these 
may even be rejected! (The Cogito, of course, remains, but it is 
without relevance.) The third proof presupposes a quite different 
approach. Its design is apparently to command the assent that God 
really exists of those who, whether theistic or atheistic, consider 
the proofs of geometry and mathematics indubitable and true. His 
point is that if you find the latter type of proofs convincing, then 
you are logically compelled to accept his ontological proof. There 
is no question of absolute certainty here; what is asserted is only at 
least a comparable degree of certainty. We may therefore infer that 
there is nothing in this that presupposes anything from the previous 
Meditations. There is no reason, therefore, why Descartes ' 
ontological argument cannot by itself be valid. 1 3 
1 3 Interestingly, in both the First and Second Set of Replies Descartes recasts his 
ontological argument into a clear syllogistic form, complete with a major premise, 
a minor premise, and a conclusion. The two versions, however, are not exactly 
identical. In the version given in the First Set of Replies (11:83). the clear and 
distinct is fully explicit in both premises. In the version given in the Second Set of 
Replies (11:106-107), on the other hand, the clear and distinct is semi-explicit in 
the major premise and missing altogether in the minor premise. In spite of these 
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Gueroult, of course, as we have seen, denies this. But not only 
may we reject his reasons for this, as I think I have shown, but we 
should also notice that he confuses soundness with validity. Gueroult 
thinks Descartes' ontoiogical argument cannot by itself be valid 
because it presupposes the veracity of clear and distinct ideas and 
this was established by the two proofs from effects. But even if 
Gueroult is right about this dependence, this would at best only 
establish that Descartes' ontoiogical argument cannot by itself be 
justifiably sound. His ontoiogical argument can still be justifiably 
valid. It is a simple point of logic that for an argument to be valid 
its premises do not have to be true but only supposed to be true. A 
valid argument is after all a conditional argument. A sound 
argument, on the other hand, requires true premises in addition to 
validity. 
But more importantly what Gueroult fails to appreciate is that 
in a sense all three proofs are on a par. If the third proof requires 
for its soundness true premises, and if these can only be guaranteed 
by establishing the veracity of clear and distinct ideas, then the 
same is the case with the first two proofs. The veracity of their 
premises cannot be guaranteed by God without involving a vicious 
circle. Instead Descartes tentatively guarantees their veracity by 
consequence of the Cogito (11:24). Gueroult (p. 243) thinks this is 
good enough to make the proofs sound, but he is wrong. This 
guarantee from the Cogito is not an absolute guarantee. That can 
only follow from the existence of God. The two proofs in the Third 
Meditation, therefore, just like the proof in the Fifth Meditation, 
differences the point to notice is that in both cases Descartes clearly thought each 
version valid on its own (contra Gueroult,p. 249) and without recourse to the two 
proofs from effects. The version in the First Set of Replies, however, may seem at 
first to contradict this interpretation, for Descartes therein tells us that "the major 
premise cannot be denied, because it has already been conceded that whatever we 
clearly and distinctly understand is true." This at first may seem an explicit con-
firmation of Gueroult's interpretation (though Gueroult wisely does not use it), 
that the third proof depends on the first two proofs because the first two proofs 
establish the veracity of clear and distinct ideas and perceptions. But contrary to 
appearances, this First Reply does not support Gueroult* s view. In what I just 
quoted. Descartes' reference is not to the two proofs from effects, or to their 
consequences; instead, his reference is simply to Caterus' acceptance (cf. 11:81 
and 11:69) of the veracity of clear and distinct ideas and perceptions. 
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can at best be regarded only as valid; to regard any of them as 
sound cannot be done without vicious circularity, 1 4 
We may also note in this regard that at the end of the Fifth 
Meditation (11:48) Descartes seems to conclude from his ontological 
proof, just like he did following his two earlier proofs (11:43), the 
veracity of clear and distinct ideas. This further suggests the 
independence of the third proof. 1 5 
Finally, we may briefly note the fact that in both the Principles 
of Philosophy and the Second Set of Replies the ontological proof 
1 4 In reply to the charge of circularity, Descartes in his Second Set of Replies 
answers that "as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are 
spontaneously convinced that it is true" (11:103) and that some clear and distinct 
perceptions of the intellect "are so transparently clear and at the same time so 
simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to be true" 
(II: 104). Descartes gives two examples, the Cogito and the proposition that "what 
is [once] done cannot be undone." He tells us furthermore that our faculty of clear 
and distinct perception is the highest faculty we have, that its judgments "could 
not be corrected by any clearer judgments or by means of any other natural fac-
ulty" (11:103). But even if we grant Descartes' claims about this psychological 
necessity, that there are some propositions that while thought of cannot possibly 
be doubted, and even if we grant further that in cases such as the Cogito this 
psychological necessity entails an epistemological necessity , it by no means fol-
lows that for all cases this psychological necessity by itself entails an epistemo-
logical necessity. In other words, just because we are psychologically incapable 
of doubting something does not by itself guarantee that that something is true. 
Indeed Descartes seems to admit as much when he says "we have everything that 
we could reasonably want. What is it to us that someone may make out that the 
perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or 
an angel, so that it is. absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged 'abso-
lute falsity1 bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest 
suspicion of it?" (11:103). The reason it should bother us. I should think, is be-
cause if while attending to each and every one of the premises that Descartes 
provides in his three proofs of God's existence it is nevertheless possible that they 
could be false, in spite of our finding them clear and distinct and therefore psy-
chologically indubitable (which itself is dubitable. see note S above), then those 
proofs fail from an epistemological point of view and can only be made sound by 
presupposing what is in dispute, namely the existence of God. Hence the circular -
ity difficulty remains. 
1 5 In contrast it is interesting to note that in the Principles of Philosophy (1:203) 
Descartes establishes the veracity of clear and distinct ideas and perceptions only 
well after he has given his three proofs of God's existence. Even more curious 
(and paradoxical) is that in his Second Set of Replies (II: 1 16) the veracity of clear 
and distinct ideas and perceptions is presupposed before the three proofs are given. 
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is given first and the other two proofs follow after. This further 
suggests that Descartes thought his ontoiogical proof independent 
of the other two proofs. 
Incidentally, Gueroult (p. 257) attempts to obviate this problem 
by arguing that in these two works the synthetic style is employed 
in which the order of topics is followed rather than the order of 
discovery or reasons. This, says Gueroult, allows Descartes to 
provide his ontoiogical proof first even though it depends on the 
two proofs which come after it. But then we may ask why Descartes 
did not put this proof third as he did in the Meditations. To this 
Gueroult gives no satisfying reply. But most importantly Gueroult 
has misunderstood what Descartes says in the Second Set of Replies 
about the analytic and synthetic styles of demonstration—his 
quotation from Burman (111:337-338) notwithstanding. According 
to Descartes both styles employ the geometric order, in which (as I 
mentioned in section I) "the items which are put forward first must 
be known entirely without the aid of what comes later" (II: 110). If, 
as Gueroult claims, Descartes' ontoiogical proof depends on the 
two proofs from effects, we must then conclude that in the Second 
Set of Replies and in the Principles Descartes erred by forgetting 
to follow the proper order. But all things considered, the error would 
seem to be Gueroult's. 
Ill 
Finally, if it is correct to think that all three proofs of God's 
existence in the Meditations are logically autonomous, why then 
do we find them in the order in which they are given there? If there 
are no logical or methodological reasons, is the result the product 
of chance or whim? Or perhaps they are given autobiographically 
in the order in which Descartes originally discovered or conceived 
them. And then perhaps their ordering is principal ly for 
psychological reasons. 
I suggest Descartes himself gives us the answer to these 
questions, and that his fundamental consideration was not an "order 
of the reasoning," strictly so called, as he sometimes implies (cf. 
11:110 and 111:163), nor simply the order in which Descartes 
"discovered" the proofs, as Burman naively quotes him as saying 
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(111:337), but instead psychological considerations, namely 
persuasion and acceptance. In his Second Set of Replies Descartes 
tells us that there may be some readers "whose natural light is so 
meagre that they do not see that it is a primary notion that every 
perfection that is present objectively in an idea must really exist in 
some cause of the idea" (11:97-98). For the benefit of these 
unfortunates, he then proceeds to tell us, "he provided an even 
more straightforward demonstration [his second proof] of God's 
existence." The import of this passage, then, seems plain enough: 
if the reader isn't bright enough to be convinced by the first proof, 
he may still be bright enough to be convinced by the second proof. 
Nevertheless, Descartes believed that it is only the educated few 
who will ever be able to grasp his arguments (cf. H:5 and 11:172), 
and then many or even most of them may never be able to (cf. 
111:198). 
Now what about the third proof, the ontological argument in 
the Fifth Meditation? That this argument is found two Meditations 
later and not in the Third Meditation with the others, is, as I hope I 
have already shown, not for any logically or methodologically 
necessary reasons. Why it is left so late, it turns out, is once again 
because of considerations of persuasion and acceptance. Just as 
Descartes thought that many would be unconvinced by the first 
proof because of their inability to grasp a particular principle, so 
he thinks the case is even more so with the third proof .The problem 
now, however, is not the lack of brightness on the part of the many 
readers to grasp a particular principle; rather it is what Descartes 
considers to be an even greater problem, the inability to break a 
particular habit of mind. This clearly comes out in his First Set of 
Replies wherein Descartes notes what he calls a "considerable 
difficulty." The difficulty is that "we are so accustomed to 
distinguishing existence from essence in the case of all other things 
that we fail to notice how closely existence belongs to essence in 
the case of God as compared with that of other things" (11:83). 
Indeed so great is this habit of mind of always separating existence 
from essence that Descartes expressed "considerable doubts" (11:85) 
about whether he should even use the ontological argument. He 
feared that if he used it earlier on (presumably with the other two 
proofs in the Third Meditation), "it might induce those who did not 
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grasp it to have doubts about the rest of my reasoning" (11:85). He 
therefore opted to place the ontoiogical proof later on, presumably 
where it would do the least damage if unsuccessfully grasped. Also, 
by placing it "later on," the mind of the reader might be more pliant 
and more disposed to breaking previous habits, as a result of having 
undergone more meditations, than it would be earlier on, so that it 
might be more ready to accept the argument at a later point (in the 
Fifth Meditation) than at an earlier point (in the Third Meditation). 
Finally, I should like to point out as further evidence the fact 
already mentioned that the three proofs in the Meditations appear 
in a different order in two other places. In both the Principles of 
Philosophy and the Second Set of Replies the third argument appears 
first, followed by the first and second arguments respectively. The 
purpose of the Principles, Descartes tells us in his letter to Mersenne 
dated December 31,1641, is to present his philosophy "in an order 
which will make it easy to teach" (111:167). A principal difference 
between it and the Meditations, he further tells us, is that what is 
explained in detail in one is explained briefly in the other, and vice 
versa. In the Second Set of Replies (II: 110-120) Descartes' purpose 
is not altogether unrelated. He agrees to state the overall argument 
of the Meditations in a compact form, in what for him is the 
geometric synthetic style.This style employs definitions, postulates, 
axioms, propositions and demonstrations. Descartes does not prefer 
this style, however, even though he says it is more compelling to 
the stubborn and argumentative reader. He prefers what for him is 
the geometric analytic style, which is the style he used in the 
Meditations. This style is more engaging to the mind, he claims, 
s ince, though it is longer and more involved, it proceeds 
methodically in the order in which the material was discovered 
and so makes the reader feel that he is discovering the arguments 
for himself. 
And so, as a final remark, if we combine this information about 
the analytic and synthetic styles with what we discovered earlier 
about what Descartes says about the respective psychological 
degrees of difficulty of the three proofs, then a most interesting 
modus operandi emerges. When Descartes wants to engage the 
mind of the reader in a sort of intellectual adventure or process of 
discovery, we get what we find in the Meditations (also the 
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Discourse on Method (1:128-129)). Here the psychologically 
intermediate proof (the first proof in the Third Meditation) comes 
first, the psychologically easiest proof (the second proof in theThird 
Meditation) follows immediately after it, and the psychologically 
most difficult proof (the ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation) 
comes third and later on. On the other hand, when Descartes wants 
to present his philosophy in a dry and systematic fashion, we get 
what we find in his textbook, the Principles of Philosophy, and in 
his proofs in the synthetic style of the existence of God in his Second 
Set of Replies. Here, quite interestingly (and I don' t think 
accidentally), in both works the psychologically most difficult proof 
(the ontological proof in the Fifth Meditation) comes first, the 
psychologically intermediate proof (the first proof in the Third 
Meditation) comes second, and the psychologically easiest proof 
(the second proof in the Third Meditation) comes third. 
I suggest that essentially prudential concerns are at work here. 
When faced with opponents, a wise strategy might be, if you have 
three forces ranked in degrees of strength, to engage the enemy 
first with your weakest force, follow that with your intermediate 
force, and then, now that the enemy is worn down, finish them off 
with your strongest force. This strategy would correspond to 
Descartes' ordering of the three proofs in the Principles and the 
Second Set of Replies, both of which are expressly intended for 
convincing stubborn and argumentative readers. 
On the other hand, when dealing not with an enemy but now 
eager and willing students and friends, a prudent approach would 
be to leave your most difficult proof for last and later on in your 
teaching/training program, so as not to discourage your disciples 
early on and ruin their confidence and impede their progress. In 
line with this thinking it might be prudent to present them with the 
intermediately difficult proof first followed immediately by the 
easiest proof. All of this, I suggest, might well be viewed as 
maximally conducive psychologically to the process of intellectual 
adventure and discovery and development in eager and willing 
minds, and is the order of proofs we find in the Meditations. 
This is all hypothesis, of course, and there is no textual evidence 
in Descartes' corpus to support it directly. Nevertheless, given the 
evidence and conclusions of the first two sections of this paper, in 
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1 6 I am indebted to Professor Georges Moyal of Glendon College, York Univer-
sity, Toronto, and to two anonymous referees of Auslegung for their helpful com-
ments and criticisms. Any misunderstandings of Descartes' philosophy that have 
remained are entirely my own. 
the absence of logical and methodological ties between Descartes' 
three proofs of God's existence the search for psychological 
considerations in his ordering of the three proofs is altogether 
appropriate and the above hypothesis not at all unlikely. 1 6 
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